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REGULARITY FOR NONLINEAR STOCHASTIC GAMES
HANNES LUIRO AND MIKKO PARVIAINEN
Abstract. We establish regularity for functions satisfying a dynamic
programming equation, which may arise for example from stochastic
games or discretization schemes. Our results can also be utilized in
obtaining regularity and existence results for the corresponding partial
differential equations.
1. Introduction
In [LPS13], we studied regularity for the stochastic game called tug-of-war
with noise. Recalling the recently discovered connection to the p-harmonic
functions [PS08], our results implied local Lipschitz regularity for the solu-
tions to the p-Laplace equation for 2 < p < ∞. The approach was based
on a choice of strategies for the players, and is thus quite different from the
PDE proofs.
Our argument utilized symmetry properties of strategies, and a sharp
cancellation effect produced by this symmetry, which directly allowed us
to obtain a local Lipschitz estimate. It is a nontrivial task to extend this
method to a more general class of problems where the perfect symmetry
breaks down. Thus, in this paper, we develop a more flexible regularity
method. As a starting point, we take a dynamic programming equation
u(x) =
1
2
sup
µ1∈A1(x)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ1(y) +
1
2
inf
µ2∈A2(x)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ2(y)
as explained in detail in Section 2.1. This is a rather general formulation
that covers a wide class of games; in addition to stochastic games it may
as well arise from discretization schemes in numerical methods for partial
differential equations, see for example [Obe05].
To illustrate our approach, we prove (asymptotic) Ho¨lder continuity, The-
orem 2.1, for several examples using the method. In particular, we prove the
regularity for the tug-of-war with noise with space dependent probabilities,
Section 5. In addition to the break down of the symmetry, the problem in
applying known approaches is the lack of translation invariance. Further-
more, we study the tug-of-war with noise related to the p-Laplacian with
the full range 1 < p ≤ ∞ in Section 6. Proving a local regularity result for
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this game may seem complicated, since the players can affect the direction
of the noise, and thus it is not easy to say much about the noise distribution.
However, the method of this paper is well suited for the task. We did not
exhaust the list of possible examples that can be treated by the method but
expect it to be useful in many more problems. Also, at least in some cases,
the method can be improved to give directly stronger regularity results.
Our method arises from stochastic game theory even if for expository
reasons we have eventually avoided stochastic arguments. The idea is that
we start the game simultaneously at two points x ∈ Rn and z ∈ Rn, and try
to pull the points ’closer’ to each other. Here closer means, at least roughly,
in the sense of averages and in terms of a suitable comparison function. To
show that we may pull the points closer in this sense, we may consider the
process in the higher dimensional space by setting (x, z) ∈ R2n, and use the
subspace
T := {(x, z) ∈ R2n : x = z} ⊂ R2n
as a target. We use the following strategy: if our opponent takes a non
optimal step we pull directly towards T . If the opponent pulls (almost)
away from T , then our strategy is to aim at the exactly opposite step.
The curvature of the comparison function gives an advantage to us. It is
also worth noting that there is a freedom to choose among the probability
measures in R2n having the measures arising from the original games as
marginals; cf. the setting in the optimal mass transport problems. Suitable
choices will be helpful in the proofs.
After finishing the paper it has come to our attention that couplings
of stochastic processes have been employed in the study of regularity for
second order linear uniformly parabolic equations with continuous highest
order coefficients, see for example [LR86], [PW06], and [Kus15]. The method
here has also some similarities to the Ishii-Lions method [IL90], see also for
example [PP13]. However, we do not rely on the theorem of sums in the
theory of viscosity solution, but the proofs are built on the ideas arising
from the game theory.
Our motivation to study the above problems is threefold: First, the study
of stochastic games has received a lot of attention on their own right because
of deep mathematical questions that arise and also due to their central
role in many applications. Second, the dynamic programming principle can
be interpreted as a discretization of the PDE. Thus, results can also be
interpreted as results for the corresponding numerical schemes. Third, by
passing to the limit with respect to the step size our results imply regularity
results for the PDE.
There is a powerful connection between the classical linear partial dif-
ferential equations and probability theory. In the nonlinear case, the con-
nection between the games and Bellman-Isaacs equations was established in
the 80s. However, a similar connection between the normalized p-Laplace
or ∞-Laplace equations (which are discontinuous operators in the gradient
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variable) and the tug-of-war games with noise was discovered only rather
recently in [PS08, PSSW09]. This connection has later been extended or uti-
lized in several different contexts, see for example [AB10, MPR10, BCF12a,
BCF12b, MPR12, APSS12, LS15, Ruo16].
2. The regularity method
2.1. Background. Let Ω ⊂ Rn, n ≥ 2, be an open and bounded set.
Denote by M the space of unit Radon measures on Rn, and suppose that
we are given
A := (A1,A2) : R
n → P(M)× P(M) ,
where P(M) denotes the family of all subsets of M . Our objective is to
develop a regularity method for bounded Borel measurable solutions u :
Ω→ R to the dynamic programming equation
u(x) =
1
2
sup
µ1∈A1(x)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ1(y) +
1
2
inf
µ2∈A2(x)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ2(y) . (2.1)
The heuristic idea is that u represents a value function for a two players
zero-sum game, where the rules of the game are determined by A1(x) and
A2(x). More precisely, when the game token is at x ∈ Ω, the maximizer can
choose µ1 ∈ A1(x) and minimizer µ2 ∈ A2(x) and then the distribution of
the next location is determined by the probability measure µ1+µ22 . Then we
can write
u(x)− u(z) =
1
2
sup
µ1∈A1(x)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ1(y) +
1
2
inf
µ′2∈A2(x)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ′2(y)
−
1
2
sup
µ′1∈A1(z)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ′1(y) −
1
2
inf
µ′2∈A2(z)
∫
Rn
u(y) dµ′2(y)
= sup
µ1∈A1(x),µ2∈A2(z)
[
inf
µ′2∈A2(x),µ
′
1∈A1(z)(∫
Rn
u(y) d
(µ1 + µ′2
2
)
(y) −
∫
Rn
u(y) d
(µ′1 + µ2
2
)
(y)
)]
.
Let Γ(
µ1+µ′2
2 ,
µ′1+µ2
2 ) denote the joint measures whose marginals are
µ1+µ′2
2
and
µ′1+µ2
2 . Then for any joint measure µ ∈ Γ(
µ1+µ′2
2 ,
µ′1+µ2
2 ) we have∫
Rn
u(y) d
(µ1 + µ′2
2
)
(y)−
∫
Rn
u(y) d
(µ′1 + µ2
2
)
(y)
=
∫
R2n
(
u(y)− u(y′)
)
dµ(y, y′).
Denoting
G(x, z) := u(x)− u(z),
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it holds that
G(x, z) = sup
µ1∈A1(x),µ2∈A2(z)
[
inf
µ′2∈A2(x),µ
′
1∈A1(z)(∫
R2n
G(y, y′) dµµ1,µ′1,µ2,µ′2(y, y
′)
)]
.
Different couplings generate different dynamic programming equations as
well as games in R2n, and we may take the advantage of this flexibility in
the proofs.
For example, with suitable couplings a tug-of-war with noise described in
[MPR12] corresponds to
G(x, z) =β
∫
B(0,ε)
G(x+ h, y + Px,z(h)) dh
+
α
2
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
G+
α
2
inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
G,
in R2n, where Px,z(h) is any isometry.
Below we will prove regularity results for several nonlinear problems of
the form (2.1). In all the examples of the paper, we require that µi ∈ Ai(x)
implies sptµi ∈ B(x, ε), where ε > 0 can be though as a step size in the
underlying game. Throughout the paper, we denote by B(x, ε) an open ball
centered at x and of the radius ε > 0. When the center point plays no role,
we may drop it and denote Bε.
Theorem 2.1. Let (x, z) ∈ BR×BR and B2R ⊂ Ω . There exists δ = δ(n) ∈
(0, 1) such that if u satisfies (2.1) in the cases specified below, then
|u(x) − u(z)| ≤ C
|x− z|δ
Rδ
+ C ′(n)
εδ
Rδ
, (2.2)
where C = C(n)(supB2R×B2R u(y)− u(y
′)).
As shown in [LPS13] this estimate can also be utilized in the proof of
Harnack’s inequality for the corresponding stochastic game.
Without a loss of generality, we may assume that z = −x, R = 1 and
supB2×B2(u(y)− u(y
′)) ≤ 1, by suitable translation, scaling and multiplica-
tion. Observe that this does not require translation invariance. After the
simplifications we see that it suffices to show that
|u(x)− u(−x)| ≤ C|x|δ + C ′(n)εδ , (2.3)
if x ∈ B1 and B2 ⊂ Ω .
2.2. Steps of the method. As indicated in the introduction, our method
arises from game theory even if for expository reasons we have eventually
avoided stochastic arguments. The first step of our regularity method is to
choose a comparison function f : R2n → R that has the desired regularity
properties. The key term in the comparison function we use to establish
Ho¨lder continuity in the examples below is C |x− z|δ, x, z ∈ Rn, δ ∈ (0, 1).
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The second step is to make a counter assumption: We wish to show that
u(x)−u(z)−f(x, z) is small enough in B1×B1\T , and in particular smaller
than in (B2×B2)\(B1×B1 \T ), and thrive for a contradiction by assuming
that it is not.
As a third step, we write down a multidimensional dynamic programming
equation for the comparison function f in R2n by using a counter proposi-
tion.
As a final step, we derive a contradicting estimate for the dynamic pro-
gramming equation of the previous step. Intuition based on game strategies
gives guidelines how to obtain such an estimate by utilizing Taylor’s expan-
sion of f(x, z) in suitable coordinates.
2.3. Comparison function. One of the key ideas of the proof is to use
a suitably chosen comparison function, defined in R2n. We use throughout
the work the function
f1(x, z) = C|x− z|
δ + |x+ z|2 ,
where C > 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1) are fixed later. The first term will give us
the desired regularity estimate, and the second term makes sure that the
estimate holds at (B2 ×B2) \ (B1 ×B1), see (3.12).
It is well known that functions satisfying the dynamic programming equa-
tion can be discontinuous at the small scale. Therefore, to prove the claim
in the case x and z are close to each other, we have to use an auxiliary
annular step function. To this end, let N = N(n) be an integer. Then, set
for i = 0, . . . , N
Ai = {(x, z) ∈ R
2n : (i− 1)
ε
10
< |x− z| ≤ i
ε
10
}
and define f2 : R
2n → [0,∞) by
f2(x, z) =
{
C2(N−i)εδ if (x, z) ∈ Ai , and
0 if |x− z| > N ε10 .
(2.4)
Observe that f2 reaches its maximum C
2Nεδ on A0 = {(x, z) : x = z} = T .
To see why we have chosen this f2, one should consult for example the
calculations after (3.22).
Our final comparison function f is composed of f1 and f2 as
f(x, z) = f1(x, z)− f2(x, z). (2.5)
We are going to produce estimates in terms of Taylor’s expansion. It will
be convenient to write the expansion in the form
f1(x+ hx, z + hz)
= f1(x, z) + Cδ|x− z|
δ−1(hx − hz)V + 2(x+ z) · (hx + hz)
+
C
2
δ|x− z|δ−2
(
(δ − 1)(hx − hz)
2
V + (hx − hz)
2
V ⊥
)
+ |hx + hz|
2 + Ex,z(hx, hz),
(2.6)
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where V is the space spanned by x − z, (hx − hz)V refers to the scalar
projection onto V i.e. (hx − hz) · (x− z)/ |x− z|, and (hx − hz)V ⊥ onto the
orthogonal complement.
The error term satisfies
|Ex,z(hx, hz)| ≤ C|(hx, hz)|
3(|x− z| − 2ε)δ−3 , (2.7)
if |x− z| > 2ε . Especially, if we choose
N ≥
100C
δ
, (2.8)
then in the case |x− z| > N ε10 and |hx|, |hz | ≤ ε, we can estimate
|Ex,z(hx, hz)| ≤ C(2ε)
3(
|x− z|
2
)δ−3
≤ 64Cε2|x− z|δ−2
ε
|x− z|
≤ 64ε2|x− z|δ−2
δ
10
≤ 10ε2|x− z|δ−2.
(2.9)
3. Tug-of-war
We start with an example: we show how to obtain the asymptotic Ho¨lder
continuity for the value functions of the tug-of-war game by using the
method of this paper. There would be simpler methods available for the
tug-of-war or the random walk, but the work done here will pay-off later, as
we will see. Indeed, we utilize these estimates later in more difficult cases of
Sections 5 and 6.
The tug-of-war is a two-player zero-sum stochastic game played in Ω with
the following rules. Fix the step size ε > 0 and an initial position x0 ∈ Ω.
The players toss a fair coin and the winner of the toss moves the game
position to any x1 ∈ Bε(x0). The players continue playing until the game
position leaves the domain Ω. At the end of the game Player II pays Player I
the amount determined by a pay-off function F defined outside Ω. Naturally,
Player I tries to maximize the outcome while Player II tries to minimize it,
and thus the value of the game (for Player I) is defined as
u(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )].
Above SI and SII denote the strategies of Player I and Player II, respectively.
If the players use strategies for which the game does not end almost surely
and thus the expectation above is not well defined, we always set it to be
−∞.
The value function of the tug-of-war game satisfies the dynamic program-
ming principle
u(x) =
1
2
{
sup
B(x,ε)
u+ inf
B(x,ε)
u
}
(3.10)
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for x ∈ Ω, see [PSSW09] and [LS15]. Intuitively, we obtain the value at
the point x by summing up the two possible outcomes of the coin toss with
corresponding probabilities. The above equation is of the form (2.1) and we
can follow the steps introduced above.
3.1. Multidimensional dynamic programming. Because u(x)−u(z) ≤
1 in B2 ×B2 and u(x)− u(z) = 0 on T , we see that
u(x)− u(z) − f(x, z) = u(x)− u(z)− f1(x, z) + f2(x, z)
≤ max f2 = C
2Nεδ ,
(3.11)
if (x, z) lies in T or in (B2 × B2) \ (B1 × B1). We also used the fact that
f1 ≥ 1 in (B2 ×B2) \ (B1 ×B1).
Next we will show that this inequality also holds in B1 × B1 \ T . This
would actually yield (2.3) with C ′(n) = C2N and, eventually, the whole
theorem. For the proof by contradiction, assume that
M := sup
(x′,z′)∈B1×B1\T
(u(x′)− u(z′)− f(x′, z′)) > C2Nεδ . (3.12)
Let then η > 0. We choose (x, z) ∈ B1 ×B1 \ T such that
u(x)− u(z) − f(x, z) ≥M − η .
Then we are ready to write our first estimate: by using (3.10) and the
choices above, we obtain
M ≤ u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z) + η
=
1
2
sup
B(x,ε)
u+
1
2
inf
B(x,ε)
u−
(
1
2
sup
B(z,ε)
u+
1
2
inf
B(z,ε)
u
)
− f(x, z) + η
=
1
2
(
sup
B(x,ε)
u− inf
B(z,ε)
u+ inf
B(x,ε)
u− sup
B(z,ε)
u
)
− f(x, z) + η
= I1 − f(x, z) + η .
(3.13)
We estimate I1, and first observe that
sup
B(x,ε)
u− inf
B(z,ε)
u ≤M + sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + η . (3.14)
This estimate follows easily by the above definition forM as follows: Suppose
that x0 ∈ B(x, ε), z0 ∈ B(z, ε) such that supB(x,ε) u ≤ u(x0) + η/2 and
infB(z,ε) u ≥ u(z0)− η/2. Then
sup
B(x,ε)
u− inf
B(z,ε)
u ≤u(x0)− u(z0) + η
=u(x0)− u(z0)− f(x0, z0) + f(x0, z0) + η
≤M + f(x0, z0) + η
≤M + sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + η .
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Observe that here we used the counter assumption. Indeed, the points x0
and z0 may lie outside B1 × B1 \ T , but from (3.12) and the preceding
discussion, we deduce that M gives us the upper bound.
Furthermore, analogous reasoning using (3.12) gives us that
inf
B(x,ε)
u− sup
B(z,ε)
u ≤M + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + η . (3.15)
To be more precise, choose x0 ∈ B(x, ε), z0 ∈ B(z, ε) such that
infB(x,ε)×B(z,ε) f ≥ f(x0, z0)− η. Then
inf
B(x,ε)
u− sup
B(z,ε)
u ≤ u(x0)− u(z0)
= u(x0)− u(z0)− f(x0, z0) + f(x0, z0)
≤ M + f(x0, z0)
≤M + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + η
and we obtain the above estimate.
Combining the estimates, we get
I1 ≤M +
1
2
(
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f
)
+ η.
From this and (3.13), we conclude that for the desired contradiction it suf-
fices to show that
f(x, z) >
1
2
(
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f
)
. (3.16)
3.2. Estimates. Next we show the validity of the inequality (3.16) for f =
f1 − f2, and for this we assume
C =
1010
δ2ω
, (3.17)
for the constant C in f1(x, z) = C |x− z|
δ+|x+ z|2. The constant ω ∈ (0, 1)
will be later defined in this section. The choice is designed to cover also
Sections 4 and 5 with additional n-dependence ω = ω(n). If |x − z| is
large enough, the validity of the inequality (3.16) turns out to follow in a
straightforward manner by using the Taylor expansion for f1. The intuition
coming from the underlying stochastic game will be useful in deriving the
estimates.
In the case |x − z| ≈ ε, we will have to take the small scale jumps into
account, and use the properties of the annular step function f2 defined in
(2.4).
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Proof of inequality (3.16), case |x − z| > N ε10 . Observe that the as-
sumption |x − z| > N ε10 implies that f2(x, z) = 0, and therefore, it suffices
to show (3.16) for f1.
Let η > 0 and choose hx, hz ∈ B(0, ε) such that
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 ≤ f1(x+ hx, z + hz) + η.
We first let θ = 1/10 and assume that
(hx − hz)
2
V ≥ (4− θ)ε
2 . (3.18)
Since |hx − hz| < 2ε, this also means that
(hx − hz)
2
V ⊥
< θε2 .
This can be though as fixing a strategy in the game in R2n.
We get by using the Taylor formula (2.6) and the estimate (2.9) for the
error term that
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − 2f1(x, z)
≤ f1(x+ hx, z + hz) + f1(x− hx, z − hz)− 2f1(x, z) + η
=
C
2
δ|x− z|δ−2
(
2(δ − 1)(hx − hz)
2
V + 2(hx − hz)
2
V ⊥
)
+ 2|hx + hz |
2 + Ex,z(hx, hz) + Ex,z(−hx,−hz) + η
≤
C
2
δ|x− z|δ−2
(
2(δ − 1)(4 − θ)ε2 + 2θε2
)
+ 2(2ε)2 + 20ε2|x− z|δ−2 + η
≤ |x− z|δ−2(20 − Cδ)ε2 + 8ε2 + η.
The final inequality above follows e.g. by the choices θ = 1/10 and δ ≤ 1/10.
By using the assumption (3.17) for C, one observes that
|x− z|δ−2(20− Cδ) < −|x− z|δ−2108 < −107 . (3.19)
Combining this with above estimates, we conclude that
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − 2f1(x, z) < −10
6ε2 .
In turn, if (3.18) above does not hold, implying that
(hx − hz)V ≤ (2−
θ
4
)ε , (3.20)
the desired estimate can be readily derived from the first order terms in
Taylor estimate. More precisely, if |hx|, |hz | ≤ ε, the share of the second
order term and the error terms in Taylor estimate (2.6) can be roughly
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estimated by
C
2
δ|x − z|δ−2(2ε)2 + (2ε)2 + 10ε2|x− z|δ−2
≤ 3Cδε2|x− z|δ−2 ≤ 3Cδε|x − z|δ−1
ε
|x− z|
≤3Cδε|x − z|δ−1
ε
N ε10
≤
30C
N
δ|x− z|δ−1ε < δ2|x− z|δ−1ε .
(3.21)
Above we used the assumption (2.8) for N and at the last step the fact that
δ ∈ (0, 1). This in connection with the Taylor formula and (3.20) gives
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − 2f1(x, z)
≤f1(x+ hx, z + hz) + f1(x− ε
x− z
|x− z|
, z + ε
x− z
|x− z|
)− 2f1(x, z) + η
≤Cδ|x− z|δ−1((hx − hz)V − 2ε) + 4 |x+ z| 2ε+ δ
2|x− z|δ−1ε + η
≤Cδ|x− z|δ−1(−
θ
4
ε) + 16ε + δ2|x− z|δ−1ε + η
≤(δ −
θ
4
C)δ|x− z|δ−1ε+ 16ε + η.
We point out that even if ε x−z|x−z| /∈ B(0, ε), the estimate for inf above is
valid due to continuity of f1. Again, by applying the assumption (3.17) for
C and choosing ω ≤ 1/10, it is easy to check the desired negativity for this
quantity. This completes the proof of the case |x− z| > N ε10 .
Proof of inequality (3.16), case |x−z| ≤ N ε10 . In this case we can use the
following elementary estimate for f1: If x, z ∈ B1, and hx, hz ∈ B(0, ε), ε <
1, then
|f1(x+ hx, z + hz)− f1(x, z)| ≤ 2Cε
δ + 16ε ≤ 3Cεδ (3.22)
which immediately follows by using the concavity and convexity of the terms
in f1. We further obtain
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − f1(x, z) ≤ 3Cε
δ . (3.23)
Moreover,
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
(f1 − f2) ≤ sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − 0.
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Since (i− 1) ε10 < |x− z| ≤ i
ε
10 for some i = 0, . . . , N , we have
inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
(f1 − f2) ≤ sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f2
≤ sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − C
2(N−i+1)εδ
≤ sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − C
2C2(N−i)εδ
= sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − (C
2 − 2)C2(N−i)εδ − 2C2(N−i)εδ
= sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − (C
2 − 2)C2(N−i)εδ − 2f2(x, z)
≤ sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − 10Cε
δ − 2f2(x, z) .
Summing up the previous two estimates and recalling (3.23), we end up with
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f+ inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f
≤ sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 + sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f1 − 10Cε
δ − 2f2(x, z)
≤ 2f1(x, z) + 6Cε
δ − 10Cεδ − 2f2(x, z)
< 2f(x, z).
This proves the estimate (3.16), and thus (2.3) and finally Theorem 2.1 in
the case of the tug-of-war.
Remark 3.1. By passing to a limit this implies Ho¨lder continuity for the
infinity harmonic functions, cf. [PSSW09] or the proof of Theorem 4.9 in
[MPR12], i.e. for the viscosity solutions to
∆∞u =
n∑
i,j=1
uijuiuj = 0,
where ui and uij denote the elements of the gradient and the Hessian, re-
spectively. As already pointed out, this is not our main motivation but we
use the estimates of this section as a tool in Section 5 without repeating them
there.
4. Random walk
We continue with another well known example: we show the asymptotic
Ho¨lder continuity for the random walk. Again some estimates in more diffi-
cult cases in Sections 5 and 6 are essentially the same, and we do not need
to repeat the estimates there. Therefore this expository choice does not add
much to the length of the paper.
We consider a version of the random walk where at x ∈ Ω the next point
is chosen according to the uniform probability distribution on B(x, ε), and
this is repeated until the process exits Ω. At this time the amount given by
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a pay-off function F defined outside Ω is collected. The function u is the
expected pay-off of this process
u(x0) = E
x0 [F (xτ )].
This expectation can also be written as an average over the neighboring
expected pay-offs as
u(x) =
∫
B(x,ε)
u dy :=
1
|B(x, ε)|
∫
B(x,ε)
u dy. (4.24)
This again is of the form (2.1) and we can employ the same method as above.
4.1. Multidimensional dynamic programming. Similarly as in Section
3, the equation (4.24) gives
M ≤ u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z) + η
=
(∫
B(x,ε)
u(y) dy −
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy
)
− f(x, z) + η
= I2 − f(x, z) + η .
Define Px,z(h) as a mirror point of h with respect to V
⊥ = span(x− z)⊥.
The term I2 (we later utilize this estimate in Section 5, which explains the
notation) can be written as
I2 =
1
|Bε|
(∫
B(x,ε)\B(z,ε)
u(y) dy −
∫
B(z,ε)\B(x,ε)
u(y) dy
+
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
u(y)− u(y) dy
)
=
1
|Bε|
(∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
u(x+ h)− u(z + Px,z(h)) dh
+
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
0 dy
)
.
Then by adding and subtracting we obtain
I2 =
1
|Bε|
(∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
(
u(x+ h)− u(z + Px,z(h))
− f(x+ h, z + Px,z(h))
)
dh
−
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f(y, y) dy
+
∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh +
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f(y, y) dy
)
≤M +
1
|Bε|
( ∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh +
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f(y, y) dy
)
,
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where we again used the definition of M , as well as the counter assumption
and the definition of f2 to estimate −f(y, y) = f2(y, y) ≤M .
From the previous estimate we conclude the desired contradiction if at
every (x, z) ∈ B1 ×B1 \ T it holds that
f(x, z) >
1
|Bε|
( ∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh
+
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f(y, y) dy
)
.
(4.25)
4.2. Estimates. Similarly as in Section 3, we estimate the two cases sepa-
rately.
Inequality (4.25), case |x− z| > N ε10 . In this case the claim reduces to
f1(x, z) >
1
|Bε|
∫
B(0,ε)
f1(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh .
We utilize the Taylor series (2.6). When integrating the series, the first order
terms vanish by symmetry, and by the definition of the mirror mapping Px,z
also (h− Px,z(h))
2
V ⊥
= 0. This and the error estimate (2.9), gives
1
|Bε|
∫
B(0,ε)
f1(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh − f1(x, z)
=
2Cδ(δ − 1)|x− z|δ−2
|Bε|
∫
B(0,ε)
h2V dh +
1
|Bε|
∫
B(0,ε)
Ex,z(h, Px,z(h)) dh
≤ 2Cδ(δ − 1)|x− z|δ−2
ε2
n+ 2
+ 10ε2|x− z|δ−2
≤ ε2|x− z|δ−2
(
10−
Cδ
4(n + 2)
)
,
where by a direct calculation
∫
B(0,ε) h
2
V dy = ε
2/(n+2) and we assumed δ ≤
1/10. Observe that since Px,z(h) gives the mirror point of h, the terms of the
form (·)V ⊥ vanished. Moreover, by symmetry the first order terms vanished
as well. Now, the assumption (3.17) on C with ω = ω(n) ≤ 1/(n + 2)
guarantees the negativity of
(
10− Cδ4(n+2l)
)
. This completes the proof of the
present case.
Inequality (4.25), case |x−z| ≤ N ε10 . For this, suppose first that |x−z| ≥
7
4ε. In this case, observe that
B
(
ε(z − x)
2|z − x|
,
ε
4
)
⊂ B(0, ε) \B(z − x, ε) ,
and
|x+ h− (z + Px,z(h))| ≤ |x− z| −
ε
10
14 LUIRO AND PARVIAINEN
for every h ∈ B(ε(z−x)2|z−x| ,
ε
4). This in turn implies, by the definition of the
annular function f2, that
f2(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) ≥ C
2f2(x, z) if h ∈ B
(ε(z − x)
2|z − x|
,
ε
4
)
.
This implies
1
|Bε|
( ∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f2(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh +
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f2(y, y) dy
)
>
1
|Bε|
∫
B( ε(z−x)
2|z−x|
, ε
4
)
f2(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh
>
|B ε
4
|
|Bε|
C2f2(x, z) =
C2
4n
f2(x, z) .
Furthermore, as before we use the rough estimate (3.22) for f1, implying
that the inequality (4.25) can fail for f1 at most by 3Cε
δ . Combining this
with the above estimate for f2, we conclude that
1
|Bε|
( ∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh +
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f(y, y) dy
)
< f1(x, z) + 3Cε
δ −
C2
4n
f2(x, z)
< f1(x, z)− f2(x, z) + 3Cε
δ − (
C2
4n
− 1)f2(x, z) < f(x, z) ,
where the final inequality follows simply by using again the size condition
(3.17) for C and choosing ω ≤ 4−n. This completes the proof of the case
|x− z| ≥ 74ε.
For the final case |x− z| < 74ε, observe that
|B(x, ε) ∩B(z, ε)| >
1
4n
|Bε| .
Moreover, because x 6= z
f2(y, y) ≥ C
2f2(x, z) .
Then we simply estimate that
1
|Bε|
∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f2(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh
+
1
|Bε|
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f2(y, y) dy (4.26)
>
1
|Bε|
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f2(y, y) dy
>
C2
4n
f2(x, z) .
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Then the desired inequality for f = f1 − f2 follows exactly in the same way
as in the case |x− z| ≥ 74ε . Again Theorem 2.1 follows.
As an application, by passing to a limit, this implies local Ho¨lder con-
tinuity for harmonic functions similarly as explained for infinity harmonic
functions in Remark 3.1. By adjusting the comparison function, it would
also be possible to obtain local Lipschitz continuity. However, for the con-
sistency of the exposition we shall not pursue this analysis here.
5. Tug-of-war with noise and space dependent probabilities
Next we proceed to new results. We consider a tug-of-war with noise and
space dependent probabilities: This is again a two-player zero-sum stochastic
game played in a domain Ω. The rules are as follows. Fix the step size ε > 0
and an initial position x0 ∈ Ω. The players start by tossing a biased space
dependent coin with probabilities α(x0) and β(x0), α(x0) + β(x0) = 1. If
the result is heads (with probability α(x0)), then they play a tug-of-war
as described in Section 3. On the other hand, if the result is tails (with
probability β(x0)), the game state moves to a random point in the ball
B(x0, ε). The players continue playing until the game position leaves the
domain Ω. Then Player II pays Player I the amount determined by a pay-off
function F defined outside Ω.
Similarly as in the tug-of-war, Player I tries to maximize the pay-off while
Player II tries to minimize it and thus value of the game is defined as
u(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )],
where SI and SII again denote the strategies of Player I and Player II,
respectively. The usual tug-of-war with noise with fixed probabilities in
[MPR12], the tug-of-war in Section 3, and the random walk in Section 4 are
special cases of this game.
Deriving the dynamic programming principle for this game is beyond the
scope of the paper (for the fixed probabilities case, see [LPS13]). Nonethe-
less, we directly take the dynamic programming equation
u(x) =
α(x)
2
{
sup
B(x,ε)
u+ inf
B(x,ε)
u
}
+ β(x)
∫
B(x,ε)
u dy (5.27)
as our starting point. Heuristically we obtain the value at the point x ∈ Ω by
summing up the three possible outcomes with corresponding probabilities.
This equation is again of such a form that we can apply our method. We
also point out that we have no regularity assumption for α(x).
5.1. Multidimensional dynamic programming. Let ε > 0 and α : Ω→
[0, 1] be a Borel measurable mapping. Without loss of generality, we may
assume max{α(x), α(z)} = α(x) and u(x) − u(z) ≥ 0. Indeed, if u(x) −
u(z) < 0, then consider −u instead. Along the same lines as before, the
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equation (5.27) gives
M ≤u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z) + η
=
α(x)
2
sup
B(x,ε)
u+
α(x)
2
inf
B(x,ε)
u+ β(x)
∫
B(x,ε)
u(y) dy
−
α(z)
2
sup
B(z,ε)
u−
α(z)
2
inf
B(z,ε)
u− β(z)
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy − f(x, z) + η
=
α(z)
2
(
sup
B(x,ε)
u− inf
B(z,ε)
u+ inf
B(x,ε)
u− sup
B(z,ε)
u
)
+ β(x)
(∫
B(x,ε)
u(y) dy −
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy
)
+
(α(x) − α(z))
2
(
sup
B(x,ε)
u+ inf
B(x,ε)
u− 2
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy
)
− f(x, z) + η
= I1 + I2 + I3 − f(x, z) + η .
The terms I1 and I2 were already estimated in the previous sections,
so we may focus our attention on I3. Choose a sequence xk such that
limk u(xk) = supB(x,ε) u. We have
sup
B(x,ε)
u−
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy =
∫
B(z,ε)
lim
k
u(xk)− u(y) dy
=
∫
B(z,ε)
lim
k
(u(xk)− u(y)− f(xk, y) + f(xk, y)) dy
≤M + sup
x′∈B(x,ε)
∫
B(z,ε)
f(x′, y) dy .
By a reversed reasoning, one can also verify that
inf
B(x,ε)
u−
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy ≤M +
∫
B(z,ε)
inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f(x˜, y) dy .
To see this, write
inf
B(x,ε)
u−
∫
B(z,ε)
u(y) dy =
∫
B(z,ε)
inf
B(x,ε)
u− u(y) dy
=
∫
B(z,ε)
inf
B(x,ε)
u− u(y)− inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f(x˜, y) dy +
∫
B(z,ε)
inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f(x˜, y) dy
≤M +
∫
B(z,ε)
inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f(x˜, y) dy .
By combining these estimates, we get that
I3 ≤
(
α(x)− α(z)
2
)(
2M + sup
x′∈B(x,ε)
∫
B(z,ε)
f(x′, y) + inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f(x˜, y) dy
)
.
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Summing up and also recalling the estimates from the previous sections,
to obtain the desired contradiction it suffices to show that f satisfies the
following three conditions at every (x, z) ∈ B1 ×B1 \ T :
f(x, z) >
1
2
(
sup
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f + inf
B(x,ε)×B(z,ε)
f
)
, (I)
f(x, z) >
1
|B(x, ε)|
( ∫
B(0,ε)\B(z−x,ε)
f(x+ h, z + Px,z(h)) dh (II)
+
∫
B(x,ε)∩B(z,ε)
f(y, y) dy
)
,
f(x, z) >
1
2
sup
x′∈B(x,ε)
[ ∫
B(z,ε)
f(x′, y) + inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f(x˜, y) dy
]
. (III)
The inequalities I and II were treated earlier in Sections 3 and 4, and we
may concentrate on the inequality III.
5.2. Estimates.
Inequality III, case |x− z| > N ε10 . As in the previous case, it suffices to
verify the desired inequality for f1. Let η > 0. Suppose that hx ∈ B(0, ε) is
such that
sup
x′∈B(x,ε)
[ ∫
B(z,ε)
f1(x
′, y) + inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f1(x˜, y) dy
]
≤
∫
B(z,ε)
f1(x+ hx, y) + inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
f1(x˜, y) dy + η =: I
1
3 .
(5.28)
Next we estimate inf x˜∈B(x,ε) f1(x˜, y) ≤ f1(x − hx, y) and use the Taylor
expansion for f1 to obtain
I13 ≤
∫
B(z,ε)
f1(x+ hx, y) dy + f1(x− hx, y) dy + η
=
∫
B(0,ε)
f1(x+ hx, z + hz) + f1(x− hx, z − hz) dhz + η
=
∫
B(0,ε)
2f1(x, z) + Cδ|x− z|
δ−2
(
(δ − 1)(hx − hz)
2
V + (hx − hz)
2
V ⊥
)
dhz
+
∫
B(0,ε)
2|hx + hz|
2 + Ex,z(hx, hz) + Ex,z(−hx,−hz) dhz + η
≤ 2f1(x, z) + Cδ|x− z|
δ−2
∫
B(0,ε)
(δ − 1)(hx − hz)
2
V + (hx − hz)
2
V ⊥
dhz
+ 2(2ε)2 + 2(10ε2|x− z|δ−2) + η.
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First, we consider the case, where hx lies close to ε
x−z
|x−z| . To be more precise,
let ∣∣∣∣hx − x− z|x− z|ε
∣∣∣∣ ≤ θ(n)ε (5.29)
such that the estimate∫
B(0,ε)
(δ − 1)(hx − hz)
2
V + (hx − hz)
2
V ⊥ dhz ≤ −
1
n+ 2
ε2.
holds for any δ ≤ 110(n+2) and θ =
1
10(n+2) by a direct estimation. Indeed,
first observe that∫
B(0,ε)
−
( x− z
|x− z|
ε− hz
)2
V
+
( x− z
|x− z|
ε− hz
)2
V ⊥
dhz = −ε
2 +
n− 2
n+ 2
ε2
and then take the small adjustments into account. Combining the above
estimates, we obtain in the case (5.29) that
I13 ≤ 2f1(x, z) − Cδ|x− z|
δ−2 ε
2
n+ 2
+ 8ε2 + 20ε2|x− z|δ−2 + η.
Using the assumption (3.17) on the size of C we get
8ε2 + 20ε2|x− z|δ−2 − Cδ|x− z|δ−2
ε2
n+ 2
+ η
< 100ε2|x− z|δ−2 − Cδ|x− z|δ−2
ε2
n+ 2
+ η
< ε2|x− z|δ−2(100 −
Cδ
n+ 2
)
< − ε2 ,
where we choose ω in the bound for C so that ω ≤ 1
n+2 , and η small enough.
This verifies the claim in the case (5.29).
In the remaining case∣∣∣∣hx − x− z|x− z|ε
∣∣∣∣ > θ(n)ε = 110(n + 2)ε, (5.30)
we utilize the first order terms in the Taylor expansion. To this end, by
(3.21), the second order and error terms are bounded by δ2|x − z|δ−1ε .
Recalling (5.28) and estimating inf x˜∈B(x,ε) f1(x˜, y) ≤ f1(x − ε
x−z
|x−z| , y), we
have
I13 ≤
∫
B(0,ε)
f1(x+ hx, z + hz) + f1(x− ε
x− z
|x− z|
, z − hz) dhz + η
≤ 2f1(x, z) +
∫
B(0,ε)
Cδ|x− z|δ−1
(
(hx − hz)V + (−ε
x− z
|x− z|
− (−hz))V
)
dhz
+
∫
B(0,ε)
2(x+ z) ·
(
(hx + hz)V + (−ε
x− z
|x− z|
+ (−hz))V
)
dhz
+ δ2|x− z|δ−1ε + η.
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In the first integral above, we estimate (−hz)V +(hz)V = 0 and (−ε
x−z
|x−z|)V =
−ε. The second integral on the right hand side above is bounded by 16ε.
Thus by using (5.30), we obtain
I13 ≤ 2f1(x, z) + Cδ|x− z|
δ−1((hx)V − ε) + 16ε+ δ
3|x− z|δ−1ε + η
≤ 2f1(x, z)− Cδ|x− z|
δ−1 θ
2
ε+ δ2|x− z|δ−1ε + η
≤ 2f1(x, z)− δ|x − z|
δ−1ε
(Cθ
2
− δ
)
+ η
≤ 2f1(x, z)− ε .
Again the final inequality follows recalling the bound (3.17) for C and choos-
ing ω ≤ 110(n+2) . This completes the proof of the present case.
Inequality III, case |x − z| ≤ N ε10 . In this case we again use the rough
estimate (3.22) for f1 in a similar spirit as before.
Consider then the quantity(
sup
x′∈B(x,ε)
[ ∫
B(z,ε)
−f2(x
′, y) + inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
−f2(x˜, y) dy
])
+ 2f2(x, z)
for f2. We use the term
∫
B(z,ε) inf x˜∈B(x,ε)−f2(x˜, y) dy, and choose x˜ such
that the distance between this choice and y is suitably smaller than |x− y|,
so that we get the desired estimate.
For that, let us define for every y ∈ B(z, ε), Px(y) ∈ B(x,
ε
2 ) such that
Px(y) =
{
x if |x− y| ≥ ε2
y if |x− y| < ε2 .
Then for any x′ ∈ B(x, ε) it holds that∫
B(z,ε)
−f2(x
′, y) + inf
x˜∈B(x,ε)
(−f2(x˜, y)) dy
≤
∫
B(z,ε)
−f2(x
′, y)− f2(Px(y), y) dy ≤ −
∫
B(z,ε)
f2(Px(y), y) dy .
Then suppose that |x−z| ≥ 2ε3 , denote z
′ = z+ 23ε
x−z
|x−z| and y ∈ B(z
′, ε3) ⊂
B(z, ε) . It follows that
|Px(y)− y| ≤ |x− y| ≤
∣∣x− z′∣∣+ ε
3
≤ |x− z| −
ε
3
.
Thus by the definition of f2 and the fact that always x 6= z, it follows that
f2(Px(y), y) ≥ C
2f2(x, z)
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in the same ball. Using this and the fact that f2 ≥ 0, we obtain∫
B(z,ε)
f2(Px(y), y) dy
≥
1
|Bε|
(∫
B(z,ε)∩B(z′, ε
3
)
f2(Px(y), y) dy +
∫
B(z,ε)\B(z′, ε
3
)
f2(Px(y), y) dy
)
≥
C2
3n
f2(x, z) > 2f2(x, z) + 6Cε
δ,
where the above inequalities follows from (3.17), the choice ω2 ≤ 3−n and
the definition of f2.
In turn, if |x− z| < 2ε3 , then we use the fact that Px(y) = y in B(x,
ε
3) ⊂
B(z, ε). This and the definition of f2 imply∫
B(z,ε)
f2(Px(y), y) dy ≥
1
|Bε|
∫
B(x, ε
3
)
f2(Px(y), y) dy
≥
C2
3n
f2(x, z) > 2f2(x, z) + 6Cε
δ .
At the last step we again used (3.17) and properties of f2 . This completes
the proof of Theorem 2.1. Observe that the choices δ = 110(n+2) and ω =
min{ 110(n+2) ,
1
4n } are sufficient with respect to all the choices made above.
The above result can be applied to the game theoretic approach to the
normalized p(x)-Laplacian
∆Np(x)u =: ∆u+ (p(x)− 2)∆
N
∞u = 0, for x ∈ Ω ⋐ R
n,
where ∆N∞u = |∇u|
−2∑n
i,j=1 uijuiuj with the notation of Remark 3.1, and
2 ≤ p(x) ≤ ∞. Indeed, the regularity estimate derived above allows us
to pass to a limit, and thus to obtain estimates for viscosity solutions (see
[JLP10], as well as [Jul15] for a different version of the p(x)-Laplacian) to
the above equation using game theory by setting
α(x) =
p(x)− 2
p(x) + n
, β(x) =
2 + n
p(x) + n
.
It is also worth noting that the approach in [PS08] and [MPR12] does not
directly extend to the game of this section, since these papers utilize the
translation invariance.
6. Tug-of-war with noise
The previous sections covered the game related to p-harmonic functions
in the case 2 ≤ p ≤ ∞. In this section, we will include the range 1 < p <
2 by considering a slight modification of the game in [PS08] suggested in
[KMP12].
Choose a starting point x0 ∈ Ω. The players fix their possible moves νI
and νII with |νI | , |νII| ≤ ε, and toss a fair coin. If Player I wins the toss,
then she tosses a biased coin. If she gets heads (with probability α > 0), the
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token is placed at x1 = x0 + νI. If she gets tails (with probability β), then
the token is placed at a random point in BνI(x0, ε), which is a ball lying in
the n− 1-dimensional hyperplane with the normal νI. Similarly if Player II
wins the toss, then he tosses a biased coin. If he gets heads (with probability
α), the token is placed at x1 = x0 + νII. If he gets tails (with probability
β), then the token is placed at a random point in BνII(ε, x0). The game is
played until the token exits Ω, and at the end Player II pays Player I the
amount given by the pay-off function F . The value of the game is given by
u(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
E
x0
SI,SII
[F (xτ )].
To avoid measurability problems, we can incorporate the continuous
boundary correction in Section 4 of [LPS14] as explained in [Har16]. How-
ever as we are studying local results, we only give a local form of the dynamic
programming equation, and take it for granted. By summing the possible
outcomes of a single game round, we heuristically obtain
u(x) =
1
2
sup
0<|ν|≤ε
{
αu(x+ ν) + β
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h) dLn−1(h)
}
+
1
2
inf
0<|ν|≤ε
{
αu(x+ ν) + β
∫
Bνε
u(x+ h) dLn−1(h)
}
,
(6.31)
where Ln−1 denotes the n − 1-dimensional Lebesgue measure and Bνε :=
Bν(0, ε). Similarly as in Section 5, we take the dynamic programming equa-
tion as our starting point straight away.
6.1. Multidimensional dynamic programming. We use the same f as
before, but now choose
C =
1010
δ2ω(α)
. (6.32)
Fix η > 0 and recall the counter assumption (3.12). Similarly as in Section
3, using (6.31), we end up with
M ≤ u(x)− u(z)− f(x, z) + η
≤ sup
νx
1
2
{
αu(x+ νx) + β
∫
B
νx
ε
u(x+ h) dLn−1(h)
}
− inf
νz
1
2
{
αu(z + νz) + β
∫
B
νz
ε
u(z + h) dLn−1(h)
}
+ inf
νx
1
2
{
αu(x+ νx) + β
∫
B
νx
ε
u(x+ h) dLn−1(h)
}
− sup
νz
1
2
{
αu(z + νz) + β
∫
B
νz
ε
u(z + h) dLn−1(h)
}
− f(x, z) + η.
Then, let Pνx,νz be a rotation, to be specified later, from the hyperplane
determined by νx to the hyperplane determined by νz so that we may briefly
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write
M ≤
1
2
sup
νx
sup
νz
{
α(u(x+ νx)− u(z + νz))
+ β
∫
B
νx
ε
u(x+ h)− u(z + Pνx,νz(h)) dL
n−1(h)
}
+
1
2
inf
νx
inf
νz
{
α(u(x + νx)− u(z + νz))
+ β
∫
B
νx
ε
u(x+ h)− u(z + Pνx,νz(h)) dL
n−1(h)
}
− f(x, z) + η
≤ I1 + I2 − f(x, z) + η.
Next we choose νIx, ν
II
z ∈ B(0, ε) that give supνx (denoted by ν
I
x) and supνz
in I1 above up to an error η/2 > 0. Then add and subtract f similarly as
in (3.14). This gives
I1 ≤
M
2
+ sup
νx,νz
T (f, x, z, νx, νz) + η,
where we used a shorthand notation
Tf := T (f, x, z, νx, νz)
:=
α
2
f(x+ νx, z + νz)) +
β
2
∫
B
νx
ε
f(x+ h, z + Pνx,νz(h)) dL
n−1(h).
Similarly to (3.15) we also estimate
I2 ≤
M
2
+ inf
νx,νz
T (f, x, z, νx, νz) + η.
In the previous two estimates, we used the counter assumption.
Similarly as before, to obtain a contradiction, it thus suffices to show
sup
νx,νz
T (f, x, z, νx, νz) + inf
νx,νz
T (f, x, z, νx, νz) < f(x, z). (6.33)
We accomplish this in several steps.
6.2. Estimates.
Inequality (6.33), case |x − z| > N ε10 . In this case we may again focus
our attention on f1. We recall the Taylor expansion
f1(x+ hx, z + hz) =f1(x, z) + Cδ|x− z|
δ−1(hx − hz)V + 2(x+ z) · (hx + hz)
+
C
2
δ|x − z|δ−2
(
(δ − 1)(hx − hz)
2
V + (hx − hz)
2
V ⊥
)
+ |hx + hz|
2 + Ex,z(hx, hz).
Choose ν ′x, ν
′
z ∈ Bε such that
sup
νx,νz
T (f1, x, z, νx, νz) ≤ T (f1, x, z, ν
′
x, ν
′
z) + η.
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Let us first assume that
(ν ′x − ν
′
z)
2
V ≥ (4− θ)ε
2 . (6.34)
Since |ν ′x − ν
′
z| ≤ 2ε, this also means that
(ν ′x − ν
′
z)
2
V ⊥ ≤ θε
2 . (6.35)
In this case, the second order terms in the Taylor estimate of the α-terms
dominate and thus yield the desired conclusion. To be more precise, we
estimate the quantity
T (f1, x, z, ν
′
x, ν
′
z) + T (f1, x, z,−ν
′
x,−ν
′
z)− 2f1(x, z). (6.36)
To this end, by using the above Taylor formula and the estimate (2.9) for
the error term, we see that the α-terms in (6.36) can be estimated as
α
2
f1(x+ ν
′
x, z + ν
′
z)) +
α
2
f1(x− ν
′
x, z − ν
′
z))− 2f1(x, z)
≤ 0 +
Cα
2
δ|x− z|δ−2
(
2(δ − 1)(ν ′x − ν
′
z)
2
V + 2(ν
′
x − ν
′
z)
2
V ⊥
)
+ α|ν ′x + ν
′
z|
2 +
α
2
Ex,z(ν
′
x, ν
′
z) +
α
2
Ex,z(−ν
′
x,−ν
′
z)
≤
Cα
2
δ|x− z|δ−2
(
2(δ − 1)(4 − θ)ε2 + 2θε2
)
+ α(2ε)2 + 20αε2|x− z|δ−2.
(6.37)
Next we estimate the β-terms
β
2
∫
B
ν′x
ε
f1(x+ h, z + Pν′x,ν′z(h)) dL
n−1(h)
+
β
2
∫
B
−ν′x
ε
f1(x+ h, z + P−ν′x,−ν′z(h)) dL
n−1(h)
(6.38)
in (6.36) by the Taylor series. By symmetry, the first order terms vanish. So
far we have not used a particular form of the rotations Pν′x,ν′z and P−ν′x,−ν′z .
Now we choose Pν′x,ν′z = P−ν′x,−ν′z such that
∣∣h− Pν′x,ν′z(h)∣∣2 ≤ θε2. This and
(6.35) imply that
Cδ|x− z|δ−2
∫
B
νx
ε
(h− Pν′x,ν′z(h))
2
V ⊥ dL
n−1(h) ≤ Cδ|x− z|δ−2θε2.
The same estimate naturally also holds for the second term of (6.38). We
may also estimate
C(δ − 1)δ|x − z|δ−2
∫
B
ν′x
ε
(h− Pν′x,ν′z(h))
2
V dL
n−1(h) ≤ 0
and thus we may bound the quantity in (6.38) by
Cβδ|x− z|δ−2θε2 + β(2ε)2 + β20ε2|x− z|δ−2. (6.39)
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Combining the estimates (6.37) and (6.39), choosing small enough δ and
θ as well as by using the assumption (6.32) for C along with choosing ω(α)
small enough, we observe that
|x− z|δ−2(20 + Cδ(βθ − α)) < −|x− z|δ−2108 < −107 .
This implies the negativity of the quantity in (6.36).
In turn, if (6.34) above does not hold, implying that
(ν ′x − ν
′
z)V ≤ (2−
θ
4
)ε ,
the desired estimate can be readily derived from the first order terms in the
Taylor estimate. Indeed, the share of the second order and error terms in
the Taylor estimate of (6.36) can be roughly estimated by (3.21) as
δ2|x− z|δ−1ε .
Furthermore, by using Taylor’s formula and the above estimate for the sec-
ond order terms and the error, we have
supTf1 + inf Tf1 − 2f1(x, z)
≤T (f1, x, z, ν
′
x, ν
′
z) + T (f1, x, z,−ε
x− z
|x − z|
, ε
x− z
|x− z|
)− 2f1(x, z) + η
≤Cαδ|x− z|δ−1((ν ′x − ν
′
z)V − 2ε) + 4|x+ z|2ε+ δ
2|x− z|δ−1ε + η
≤Cαδ|x− z|δ−1(−
θ
4
ε) + 16ε + δ2|x− z|δ−1ε + η
≤(δ − α
θ
4
C)δ|x− z|δ−1ε+ 16ε + η.
Observe that above the first order terms in the Taylor series of β-terms
vanish in the integration by symmetry and also since P·,· is a rotation. By
applying the assumption (6.32) for C for small enough ω(α) ≤ αθ, it is easy
to check the desired negativity for this quantity. This completes the proof
of the case |x− z| > N ε10 .
Inequality (6.33), case |x − z| ≤ N ε10 . Recall that when x, z ∈ B1, and
hx, hz ∈ Bε, then
|f1(x+ hx, z + hz)− f1(x, z)| ≤ 3Cε
δ
as in (3.22). This implies
supTf1 − f1(x, z) ≤ 3Cε
δ .
Moreover,
supT (f1 − f2) ≤ supT (f1 − 0) = supTf1.
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Letting (i− 1) ε10 < |x− z| ≤ i
ε
10 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we also have
inf T (f1 − f2) ≤ supTf1 − supTf2
≤ supTf1 − αC
2(N−i+1)εδ
= supTf1 − α(C
2 −
2
α
)C2(N−i)εδ − 2C2(N−i)εδ
= supTf1 − α(C
2 −
2
α
)C2(N−i)εδ − 2f2(x, z)
< supTf1 − 6Cε
δ − 2f2(x, z)
for small enough ω(α) in (6.32). Combining the previous estimates, we end
up with
supTf + inf Tf < supTf1 + supTf1 − 6Cε
δ − 2f2(x, z)
≤ 2f1(x, z) + 6Cε
δ − 6Cεδ − 2f2(x, z)
≤ 2f(x, z).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
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